Waldram Shines Bright - The Impact of Ludgate House on the Rights to Light Landscape

This month the High Court released its eagerly anticipated decision in Cooper v Ludgate House [2025] EWHC 1724 (Ch). The claim was brought by two leaseholders of flats in Bankside Lofts seeking an injunction to restrain the alleged interference with their right to light caused by Native Land’s recently developed Arbor Building which was the first part of their wider Bankside Yards redevelopment. The Claimant leaseholders were refused an injunction but awarded substantial damages instead.

The case has already been extensively covered in the media and property press. It is rare for cases of this nature to fight all the way to trial due to the high stakes of the injunction threat. The last decided rights of light case was Beaumont v Florala in 2020 which saw an injunction granted, since then we have seen two high-profile cases settle on the steps of the Court. It is therefore no surprise that this decision has garnered such interest, particularly given the uncertainty as to all aspects of rights of light claims including how light should be measured, how much light should be considered sufficient, whether an injunction remains the primary remedy and if damages in lieu are awarded what is the correct approach. We consider the key takeaways from the decision.

Light which cannot be protected by an injunction is to be disregarded in any assessment

This was the first time the interaction between the impact of the powers of a local authority to acquire land for planning purposes under Section 203 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“Section 203”) and a standard rights to light claim has been considered (and may well be the last, given the peculiar set of facts). In short, the Court decided that alternative light sources which could not be protected because of Section 203 should not be taken into account when determining if there is sufficient light. This led to a consideration of how you approach the much debated situation where a building or window enjoys light from different sources. This is often referred to as cumulative losses and draws in part from the decision in Sheffield Masonic Hall Company Ltd v Sheffield Corporation (1932) which said that where a room enjoys light from different windows over two separate parcels of land and a development is planned on one parcel, when modelling the impact of that development on the room it is necessary to assume a similar development on the other parcel of land. Whether this principle applies to a single window overlooking two or more parcels of land was touched on in the recent decision but the legal position remains far from clear.

The Waldram method has come out fighting and appears to be stronger than ever

This was also the first time that the Court considered in detail other “radiance” methods of measuring light (in this case Median Daylight Illuminance (MDI) and Median Daylight Factor (MDF)) as against the more traditional Waldram method. There was some discussion of this in Beaumont v Florala but the case against Waldram was put much more strongly here.

The developer’s preferred method was MDI and it argued that the Waldram method was outdated and unreliable. Whilst the Judge found that Waldram has its limitations, it was industry standard and had been used as the basis for settlement offers in rights to light claims made to other neighbours by the developer in this case. It had been used this way for around 100 years and there was no rival test that had been calibrated by testing and experience in the same way.

It was only where there was an unusual room configuration (which it was accepted was not the case here) that the results might be distorted. Similarly, the Judge accepted that where the losses under the Waldram method were marginal, looking at the losses under other methods may be justifiable. In this case the results using the other methods merely served to corroborate the Waldram results. The Judge felt that the subjectivities of analysing the alternative methods undermined their reliability.

Where a room is reduced to below 50% adequately lit, even only marginally, the perceptibility of light won’t mitigate that result

The expert for the Claimants accepted that where premises are already poorly lit it would be appropriate to ask whether a worsening of the light would be noticeable and that a 2% margin would generally be allowed. However, a separate test of perceptibility was not accepted by the Judge. In a case where the reduction was from 51.1% to 49.9% on the Waldram method, whether perceptible or not, that loss would have a substantially adverse impact on the use and enjoyment of the premises. The only way round this would be to try to demonstrate that the Waldram results were unreliable – particularly in marginal cases – in which case other more modern methods of assessment could possibly assist.

The Shelfer test is most definitely out and a new more nuanced approach to considering whether to grant an injunction is in

The Court confirmed that the new approach indicated by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v Fen Tigers (2014) rather than following the less flexible Shelfer test was to be preferred when considering whether to grant an injunction or damage in lieu. The primary remedy remains an injunction and it is for the developer to say why it shouldn’t be granted. In carrying out the balancing act the Court will consider a wide range of factors. In this case, one of the most interesting findings of the Judge was regarding the conduct of the developer. He considered that the developer had somewhat overstated the matter by describing its conduct as “neighbourly” and there having been “extensive consultation”. However, he found that the risk taken in commencing the development without having settled the claims was a necessary part of commercial life and should not be regarded as reckless behaviour.

There was also a discussion regarding the significant waste that would result if Arbor would be demolished although the Judge made it clear that this is not a trump card to excuse wrongful conduct that causes serious harm. The fact that the rest of the Bankside Yards development had been subject to Section 203 was no doubt in the forefront of the Judge’s mind too. The key point being that even if an injunction was granted a new building could be built with the benefit of the Section 203 rendering the injunction futile.

The Claimants were entitled to substantial negotiating damages, but they were not in a ransom position

Negotiating damages were awarded on the basis of a hypothetical negotiation for a release of the Claimants’ rights to light between the parties acting reasonably. The Judge therefore rejected the Claimants’ claim for damages of around £3 million for each flat, almost three-times the value of the flats, as they would not have been in a ransom position. However, the developer’s approach in relying on its settlements with other flat owners as comparable “market evidence” was also rejected. Ultimately the gain attributable to the interference with the various claims was around 12.5% or £3.75 million to be shared amongst all those with a claim. The final figures were adjusted down in view of the value of the Claimants’ flats with £500,000 being awarded to one of the leaseholders and £350,000 to the other.

Where does this leave us?

Costs are still to be dealt with and are likely to be a significant factor in the overall outcome. There is also the possibility of an appeal although given the full reasoned judgment, and the balance it strikes between the parties, it remains to be seen whether either side has an appetite to take this further.

In terms of the impact on future claims the landscape remains largely the same save that Waldram is most definitely here to stay. Developers will be buoyed by the judge’s approach to the injunction but less happy at the significant award of damages for relatively low losses of light. On the latter point, it is fair to say that the Judge distinguished between the settlements reached prior to proceedings which he accepted would be at much lower levels and those awarded by the Court which by their nature being in lieu of an injunction would be much higher.