Q&A: Agreeing electronically

Laura Bushaway and Jeff Hardman tackle questions on contracts created via text message and disposition of an interest in a property by e-mail.

Question

I arranged for a contractor to build an extension at my property. I initially contacted him by e-mail and he then inspected and sent me a quote via text message. The works were expected to take six months. We agreed over text message that I would pay the costs in two instalments – the first when the works commenced and the second, one month after the works have completed. The contractor is in the process of constructing the extension but has issued monthly invoices. Do I have to pay these?

Answer

Assuming that there were no further communications after the exchange of text messages, the contractor has agreed with you to accept payment of the cost of the extension in two payments. Accordingly, you are unlikely to be liable to pay the monthly invoices.

Explanation

While traditionally contracts have been entered into via the exchange of written communications, including letters or e-mail, the courts will look at all of the circumstances in determining the nature of a concluded contract. In Jaevee Homes Ltd v Fincham [2025] EWHC 942 (TCC), the court held that the exchange of WhatsApp messages, while informal, constituted a contract.

In that case, a developer agreed with a contractor to demolish a nightclub. After initial negotiations, the parties exchanged a series of WhatsApp messages in which the developer confirmed the contractor had the job and that invoices would be payable on a monthly basis. The court held that the parties had agreed the scope of the works and the price via the WhatsApp messages. In addition, the parties had not given any indication that the final terms of the agreement depended on completion of a formal contract or incorporation of the contractor’s standard terms. In the court’s view, the evidence showed a concluded contract by WhatsApp and therefore the developer was liable to pay monthly invoices rather than pay under the contractor’s standard terms.

In your case, it would be necessary to review the complete exchange of correspondence. However, on the basis of the information you have supplied, a court is likely to conclude a contract has been created by text message and that the payment basis is two instalments.

Question

I purchased a cottage called The Laurels in 2015 with my partner. I was named on the legal title but we agreed to hold the property as beneficial joint tenants. Unfortunately, our relationship broke down in 2020. My former partner e-mailed me from their personal e-mail account in the following terms last year: “As I embark on my new path, I must sever all ties to my former life. The Laurels is yours. I want no part of it. [Their name]”. They recently contacted me, claiming a 50% share, arguing their e-mail was merely an emotional outburst with no legal effect. What is my position?

Answer

You are likely to be the sole beneficial owner of The Laurels. The e-mail constituted an immediate and valid release of your former partner’s interest, satisfying the statutory formalities for disposing of an equitable interest (or a right to benefit from the property without legal ownership) as interpreted in the decision in Hudson v Hathway.

Explanation

The central question is whether your former partner’s e-mail effected an immediate disposition of their beneficial interest. The analysis is guided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hudson v Hathway [2022] EWCA Civ 1648; [2022] EGLR 10, which clarified the modern requirements for such a release.

A release of a beneficial interest is a disposition of an equitable interest, which must be “in writing signed by the person disposing of the same” (section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925). Your former partner’s e-mail must therefore satisfy two key criteria.

First, the language must show an intention to dispose of the interest immediately, not a promise to do so later. The words “The Laurels is yours. I want no part of it,” are unequivocal and in the present tense. The words evince a clear, objective intention to divest themselves of their interest at that moment.

Second, the e-mail is clearly “in writing”. Hudson confirmed that deliberately typing one’s name on an e-mail to authenticate it constitutes a valid signature. The fact the e-mail included the typed name of your former partner serves to authenticate the message as their own deliberate act and is a signature for the purposes of the Act.

Unlike the recent appeal in Dervish v Deniz [2025] EWHC 902 (Ch), where a similar “release claim” was raised too late in the proceedings to be considered fairly, here the release is the central issue to your situation. Your former partner’s e-mail fulfils the statutory requirements. It was a signed, written document that manifested a clear and immediate intention to release their beneficial interest in The Laurels. However, you will need to seek professional advice.

Laura Bushaway is a knowledge development lawyer in the real estate disputes team at Charles Russell Speechlys and Jeff Hardman is a barrister at Landmark Chambers.

This was an article co-written with Estates Gazette and was published on 26 August 2025.