Informal family agreements, constructive trusts and joint property ownership – lessons from the recent High Court decision in Uddin v Uddin [2026] EWHC 150 (Ch)

In Uddin v Uddin [2026] EWHC 150 (Ch), the High Court overturned the County Court’s previous decision on beneficial property ownership in a lengthy property dispute. The decision of the High Court is important – it confirms that an oral agreement to change beneficial interests within an established constructive trust cannot be enforced in equity unless the benefiting party can show significant detriment due to their reliance on the agreement.  

Although Uddin related to a residential property, the decision is relevant to farming families too. It’s another example of a case in which the breakdown in a sibling relationship and informal discussions and promises of the sort that are common in a family context have resulted in the Court becoming the final arbiter of who has what interest in property, with the time, cost and emotional toll that entails.

Background

The case concerns a dispute between two brothers, Jamal and Fakar Uddin, over the beneficial ownership of a property at 120 Yeading Lane, Hayes (the Property).

The Property was acquired in 1999. Although it was registered in Jamal's sole name due to the difficulties that Fakar faced in obtaining a mortgage due to his self-employed status, the intention was that the brothers have equal beneficial interests, 50% each. In 2002, when the Property was remortgaged, it was transferred into joint names using a TR1 form containing an express declaration of trust confirming they held as joint tenants.

Over the years that followed various disputes arose concerning the joint ownership of the Property, including the costs incurred by Fakar, and the use of the Property by relatives. In December 2007, a family conciliation meeting known as a "Bisar" took place, at which the brothers discussed various disputes, including the joint ownership of the property. At the Bisar Jamal indicated to Fakar that his beneficial share of the Property would be transferred to him, resulting in Fakar being sole beneficial owner, in exchange for Fakar giving up his claim for equitable accounting of the costs he had incurred on the Property. However, in May 2008, Jamal changed his mind. Also in May 2008, a TR1 form purporting to bear Jamal's signature was filed with the Land Registry to transfer the Property into Fakar's sole name. This was subsequently found to be a forgery, and the Register was rectified in 2013 to show Jamal as joint owner.

The first instance decision

Jamal brought a claim under Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 for a declaration of joint beneficial ownership and an order for sale. The key question for the court to decide at first instance was whether Jamal had agreed at the Bisar to relinquish his beneficial interest to Fakar and whether by doing so it gave rise to a new constructive trust in favour of Fakar.  If that was the case and Fakar was held to be the sole beneficial owner, Jamal’s claim would be dismissed.

At first instance, Recorder Halford found that "both brothers relied to their detriment on the common intention" at the Bisar. The "detriment" he identified was, in essence, the mutual exchange of promises: Jamal agreed to give up his beneficial interest, and Fakar in return agreed to give up his claim to an equitable accounting for everything he had contributed to the Property. The Recorder’s reasoning was that this reciprocal bargain was sufficient to establish the constructive trust in favour of Fakar.

The Appeal

Jamal appealed the decision.  There were two key legal issues to be determined on appeal.

1. Could an oral agreement at the Bisar give rise to a (new) valid constructive trust or was this oral variation of the express trust really the disposal of a subsisting equitable interest?
2. What was the correct approach to considering detriment when considering if a constructive trust has arisen? 

Section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that a disposition of an equitable interest subsisting at the time of disposition must be in writing signed by the person disposing of it – so the agreement would need to have been committed to writing and Jamal would need to have signed.  However, section 53(2) provides that this requirement does not apply to the creation or operation of constructive trusts.  

Constructive trusts arise where it would be unconscionable for a person who holds an asset to deny the beneficial interest of another person in the asset. The claimant is required to show that there was an agreement that they should have a beneficial interest in the property, and that they have acted to their detriment in reliance on this common intention. The agreement can be expressed or inferred from conduct.

Jamal argued the judge at first instance was wrong to find that a new constructive trust had arisen, with both brothers relying to their detriment on the common intention, because the Recorder had not adequately addressed the question of detrimental reliance by Fakar, in particular whether Fakar had relied on the oral agreement made at the Bisar to his detriment, an essential element of the common intention constructive trust, and whether any detriment suffered was substantial. If there wasn’t a “new” constructive trust and this was disposal of a subsisting interest, the requirements of section 53(1)(c) would apply.

The decision

Mr Justice Adam did not agree with the reasoning of the judge in the County Court:

• Conflation of consideration and detriment: what the judge described as "detriment" was Fakar’s consideration for the bargain with Jamal.   Fakar’s offer to abandon his claim for equitable accounting was in consideration for Jamal’s transfer of his beneficial interest to him rather than a step taken in reliance on the common understanding. Accordingly, Fakar hadn’t suffered detriment by relying on Jamal’s agreement to transfer his beneficial share. There was no finding that Fakar had taken steps that left him "substantially worse off".
• Misplaced focus on agreement rather than reliance: the judge's reasoning focused on establishing that an agreement had been reached at the Bisar but did not deal with what steps (if any) Fakar had taken in reliance on that agreement afterwards.  
• Focus on wrong party's detriment: while identifying what Jamal agreed to give up was relevant to establishing the common intention, the crucial question was what Fakar did or refrained from doing in reliance on that intention and how he suffered detriment. The items of expenditure belatedly relied upon by Fakar's counsel on appeal as proof of detrimental reliance were insufficiently explored and were complicated by the timeline of Jamal's swift change of heart following the Bisar and by the forged TR1.

The appeal was allowed and the parties were invited to make submissions on the appropriate next course, which Mr Justice Adam provisionally indicated might be:

• for the matter to be remitted to the County Court, for the Court to determine the question of detrimental reliance; or
• for Fakar to accept that on the face of it Jamal has a 50% beneficial interest in the Property, but for the matter to remitted to the County Court to consider further whether the Property should be sold and whether there should be an accounting as between Fakar and Jamal given the apparent disparities in their expenditure on, and enjoyment of, the Property over time.

Key takeaways

• Oral agreements to transfer beneficial interests in property are inherently risky. Even where a clear agreement is reached, s. 53(1)(c) LPA 1925 requires a written disposition of a subsisting equitable interest.
• Detrimental reliance must be evidenced: agreement alone is not enough.  An oral agreement will only be effective if it gives rise to a constructive trust, which requires detrimental reliance. Therefore, a change in beneficial ownership under a common intention constructive trust requires clear proof of substantial detrimental reliance after the new intention is formed. While section 53(1)(c) LPA 1925 bites on dispositions of existing equitable interests unless a new constructive trust arises; section 53(2) does not dispense with the requirement for “detrimental reliance”.
• Equity will not routinely rescue families from the consequences of informality.  The Court’s approach in Uddin is consistent with the recent decision in Conway v Conway (which is discussed in more detail in a previous edition of Field Notes). For property owners (whether the property is residential, agricultural or of any other type), the message is clear: agreements need to be recorded, structured and documented in a legally sound way, not just informally promised.  When the Court becomes the final arbiter of who owns the land, that can be expensive, time consuming and stressful for everyone involved.